These are contested and shifting categories that have been explored in many different areas of decision making. 4 I add two further, less well-discussed, categories. I discuss prior institutional knowledge claims, by which I mean knowledge that has formerly been absorbed within the system, in this case by means of statutory landscape designations. And my fourth category comprises the professional knowledge claims of the expert planner, in this case the Examining Authority (ExA) appointed by the Planning Inspectorate to advise the Secretary of State.
The discussion here is very particularly about the ways in which planning approaches knowledge claims in respect of (1) landscape and seascape impacts of (2) nationally significant (3) wind energy projects. Landscape is interesting precisely because of its slightly ambiguous status in terms of factual claims; in other areas no doubt knowledge will be constructed differently. Wind is a nice study, not only for its landscape and seascape impacts, but also because climate change exposes the complexity of land use, discouraging any knee jerk advocacy of local resistance. 5 And the NSIP process under the Planning Act 2008 is distinct from local planning authority processes, with their specific local concerns and democratic links with local people. Empirical evidence seems to confirm what lawyers would expect: local and centralised planning processes approach lay and local knowledge and experience differently. 6 The Planning Act also provides an unusually extensive, but confined, set of resources on decision making. Changing any of these three criteria would make for a different analysis, and a different paper. Certain conclusions drawn from these cases do however fit in well with observations made in other areas, and others are at least suggestive of more far reaching lessons, as discussed further below. Perhaps, however, one of the most vivid lessons from this set of material is precisely that knowledge is not universal, but is constructed through a particular legal and social process.
The 2015 rejection of the application for development consent for the Navitus Bay Wind Park 7 provides an interesting comparison with earlier nationally significant wind energy infrastructure 4 Eg M Aitken 'Wind power planning controversies and the construction of "expert" and "lay" knowledges ' (2009) applications, which had all been granted consent. 8 After a brief introduction to the decision in Navitus, followed by an equally brief introduction to the multiple meanings and rich layering of landscape, 9 I turn below to the different ways in which knowledge is introduced and constructed in the NSIP process, drawing some conclusions about the laborious shaping of objectivity in a difficult area.
The Navitus Bay Decision
In 2014, Navitus Bay Development Limited applied for a Development Consent Order under The decision on the application 'must' be made in accordance with any relevant National Policy Statement, other than in specified circumstances, most pertinently if the decision maker 'is satisfied that the adverse impact of the proposed development would outweigh its benefits'. 16 The National Policy Statements for energy generally (EN-1), and for renewable energy (EN-3) 17 contain a strong presumption in favour of development, and have been crucial to the consenting of locally-controversial, nationally significant wind farm development. They anticipate many possible local objections, and often go on to explain why these various concerns need not (or less commonly cannot) outweigh the need for energy infrastructure development. 18 The National Policy Statements make it clear that wind farms will always have significant landscape and visual impacts, and that mitigation of these impacts may not be feasible since that would reduce the amount of electricity generated. 19 ExA reports, including Navitus, rehearse the various statements in the National Policy Statements that tend to lessen the impact of the strongly expressed views of local people, and even findings of very severe visual impacts, 20 which are almost inevitably outweighed by the policy need for renewable energy.
Visual and landscape issues were however decisive in the rejection of the Navitus Bay project:
The key issue of greatest concern to the Panel is the adverse impacts arising from the visual effects of the offshore elements of the proposed development on a range of national and international designations. The level of harm resulting from the Project's offshore elements is considered by the Panel to be of such seriousness as to outweigh its benefits. The difference of result between Navitus and the other applications, where landscape concerns were also strongly expressed, is difficult to explain. In the end, the planning judgment is simply different. This may be about the facts on the ground; the Navitus Bay project was certainly huge, and perhaps its location was just 'worse' than the others: 'The ExA draws the Secretary of State's attention to the unique physical characteristics of the Navitus Bay location … The area is characterised by exceptional scenic, dramatic qualities of the coastline and the presence of notable geological and historic features and headlands at various points along the coastline. A combination of these factors renders the area unique in terms of its landscape/seascape environment, and particularly sensitive to offshore energy developments in its vicinity.' 22 Whilst I do not argue that we can make a simple connection between differences in result and differences in knowledge making practices, there may also be distinctive patterns of knowledge claim in Navitus. The technical and expert knowledge claims of the applicant were very robustly challenged by objectors, and specifically through competing technical and expert knowledge claims. And further, the shape of the prior institutional knowledge was novel in this case, since the project would affect an area designated as a World Heritage Site. The shifting political and policy context for wind development may also have affected the ability for objectors' inputs to be properly heard within the process. Government policy had virtually reversed between the issuing of the National Policy Statements in 2011 and the rejection of the Navitus application in 2015, from enthusiasm 23 towards wind farm development to downright hostility, at least to onshore wind. 24 This may reflect public opposition in an interesting interplay between high level policy and individual decisions. 25 For current purposes, whilst any change of approach had not been provided for in the formal policy contained in the 22 Ibid, para 7. Particularly telling is the criticism that the writing is for the metropolitan reader, representing an urban vision of 'countryside', and that (perhaps in consequence) there is an absence of real concern for 'nature'. 43 First, this criticism emphasises the reality of the constructedness of landscape; it is almost the point that the landscape is what the individuals and communities of users, beholders, writers and readers make of it. It also feeds into a bigger question of the extent to which 'landscape' incorporates broader ecosystem and biophysical aspects of land, including how and whether a thriving ecology affects human responses to landscape.
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The powerful mixture of issues inherent in landscape suggests special challenges for achieving the knowledge necessary to provide acceptable reasons for a decision, and reinforces the intuition that landscape will be a revealing area in which to study knowledge claims. In particular, singular expertise in any particular area is unlikely to provide a rounded picture of landscape; lived experience is an important factor; and the planning process itself ), human responses may be more openly discussed in respect of visual impacts than landscapes.
The density of 'landscape' is however difficult to carry through to decision-making at any level, 52 and as the regulatory process progresses there is a certain 'narrowing of vision'. 53 To the extent that they are clear, the ExA Reports tend to reason around landscape as predominantly a visual or aesthetic question, focusing on surface appearance, on the physical rather than the symbolic or socially constructed. This reduction of landscape to a physical entity is apparent in certain of the knowledge claims discussed below, especially the technical / expert knowledge claims, and in this it resonates with efforts to universalise through technical expertise in many areas of regulation. Moreover, at first glance, it hardly simplifies, given the centuries of debate about subjectivity and objectivity in aesthetic judgments. 54 The prior institutional knowledge claims discussed below become an even more important resource: as well as 'settling' questions of aesthetic value, they may in some cases implicitly enrich the notion of landscape beyond the physical. These issues could also be profitably explored from a 'public participation', rather than a 'knowledge', perspective; public participation as a way to encourage learning, and to improve the substantive outcomes of decisions. in which it takes the evidence presented (knowledge claims) and determines whether it constitutes valid evidence (including knowledge) that provides a good reason for a decision.
Prior Institutional Knowledge Claims
EN-1 provides that 'Landscape effects depend on the existing character of the local landscape, its current quality, how highly it is valued and its capacity to accommodate change'. The ExA concluded that 'the adverse impacts of the Project on the qualities that merited the 73 ExA report, above n 21, para 9.3.15. 74 Ibid, para 9.3.20. 75 Development within a designated area should only be granted 'in exceptional circumstances', EN-1, above n 17, para 5.9.10; the applications discussed here are for projects that affect designated areas. 76 This emphasis on designation, which is consistent with other ExA Reports (and of course, consent has in almost all cases been granted), provides an external assessment of the current landscape and the values associated with that landscape. Importantly, but unsurprisingly, this manifestation of prior institutional knowledge is not challenged or unsettled in the process.
One of the valuable roles of law here is to provide stability by cutting short debates. 81 But equally, the meaning of the designation (an AONB is an area -note, not a 'landscape' -that appears to be 'of such outstanding natural beauty' that it should be so designated) is hidden from sight. 'Natural beauty' as the legal criterion for designation does not reflect the fullness of 'landscape' as discussed above. So at first sight, and often on a closer look, 82 reliance on designation is likely to reduce the meaning of landscape to the aesthetic and the visual.
However, the process for designation can be lengthy and involve many people, inevitably calling into question the presumed self-evidence of 'natural beauty'. 83 National Parks are slightly more broadly defined than AONBs, expressly incorporating 'wildlife and cultural heritage' within the concept of 'natural beauty', and with broader purposes. But even for AONBs, Natural England take the view that 'fauna and flora …, geological and physiographical features and cultural heritage can contribute to the natural beauty of all landscapes and that any assessment of natural beauty must take these factors into consideration … the presence of particular wildlife or cultural heritage features can make an appreciable contribution to an area's sense of place and thereby heighten the perception of natural beauty'. This broader context suggests that reliance on prior institutional knowledge has the potential to bring into the planning process some of the multiple complexities of landscape and place discussed above, which would otherwise be difficult to handle. Nevertheless, however rich (or   otherwise   91 ) the designation might be, the 'known' qualities of a particular landscape becomes difficult to contest. Whilst understandings of landscape are generally understood to be dynamic, the focus on prior institutional knowledge claims limits the space for any further or deeper elaboration of, for example, place attachment, or the effects of the proposal itself on the ways people respond to landscape.
A further role for prior institutional knowledge in the form of designation is the implicit downgrading of the sensitivity of landscapes that have not been nationally designated. These 'everyday' 92 landscapes are not ignored, 93 and one way they enter the decision is through discussion of 'visual receptors' found outside nationally designated areas. 94 This is a matter of impression, but non-designated landscapes seem to enjoy less space and energy in the reports and the ExA approach is brief and relatively dismissive. This section of the Navitus Report, for example, concludes by citing the National Policy Statements, to the effect that virtually all nationally significant energy projects will have effects on landscape.
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The special attention to designated areas in ExA reports is legally necessary, since decision makers must 'have regard to' the purposes of the designation: of 'conserving and enhancing the natural beauty of the [AONB]'; and of 'conserving and enhancing the natural beauty, wildlife and cultural heritage of the National Park … and … promoting opportunities for the 88 Selman and Swansick, above n 54. 89 Cited in Navitus, above n 21, para 7.3.50.
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Dorset AONB Management Plan 2014-2019, http://www.dorsetaonb.org.uk/the-dorsetaonb/management-plan. 91 Butler, ibid. 92 Above n 46. 93 Although 'local landscape designations should not be used in themselves to refuse consent', EN-1, above n 17, para 5.9.14. 94 Navitus, above n 21, para 7.3.234 onwards. 95 Ibid, para 7.3.258.
understanding and enjoyment of [its] special qualities'. 96 In this context, one role for National Policy Statements has been to endorse the acceptability of at least some harm to designated areas, given the need for renewable energy development. The careful attention to designation is especially important when consent is granted -and recall that in the case of nationally significant wind farms, consent is the norm. The ExA Report for the (approved) Rampion
Offshore Wind Farm, for example, 'gives substantial weight to conservation of the natural beauty of the landscape and countryside within the [South Downs] National Park', which even according to the applicant will be subject to 'significant and adverse' effects from a number of viewpoints, 97 nevertheless concluding that the benefits of the project are not outweighed by the costs.
Expert or technical knowledge claims
Without entering into questions of who counts as an expert and what counts as expertise, 98 and taking for granted that the expert or technical knowledge claim is not value free, 99 the knowledge claims considered here are technically framed contributions, using consistent language and benchmarks, and self-consciously aspiring to objectivity. The methodologies used are often formalised and approved in planning policy, including the National Policy . 99 There is a startling example in the applicant's Seascape, Landscape and Visual Impact Assessment: 'large scale, open views / panoramas' necessarily to reduce the susceptibility of a landscape, para 13.3.76. This is however obliquely challenged in the ExA Report as a misapplication of guidance, above n 21, para 7.2.26. 100 EN-1, above n 17, para 5.9.5, footnote 125; including the second edition of the Landscape Institute publication, above n 48. 101 The use of guidance was important to the ExA's explicit finding that the applicant's visualisations had not been 'deliberately misleading or intentionally under-representative', above n 21, para 7.2.54 onwards.
follow, or properly to interpret and apply, approved approaches can conversely be a barrier to the acceptance of claims about impact. (ability to accommodate development) and value; susceptibility is rated as 'high-medium-low'
and value as 'national, international, local, community or limited'. 105 Guidance is crucial in establishing this approach, and the approval of those methodologies in government policy is an important legitimacy measure. 'Magnitude' of effects is measured on a 'high-medium-lowvery low' scale, by combining consideration of scale, extent and duration of effects. 106 Finally, the crucial question of significance of effects is assessed, combining sensitivity and magnitude in an exercise of planning judgment. 107 All of this makes for a lengthy, technical assessment, presented in cool language that differs markedly from some of the more heated language used by those resisting the development, or in some of the literature. 108 This careful attention to categorising landscape impacts is a consistent feature of all of the ExA reports on windfarms, with the applicant's Environmental Statement at the centre of the discussion, and debate over methodologies. lay objections to other nationally significant wind farm proposals were not decisive. The ExA in the Burbo Bank Report is careful to acknowledge 'the sincere care, concern and love' expressed by local people 'for the qualities of their local environment and the opportunities that it provides'. But 'just because these opportunities will be changed by the development does not equate to a finding that the change will occasion unacceptable harm', 122 turning to impact assessments and the need for renewable energy. And in a return to the importance of methodology, whilst the applicant's conclusions on landscape were disputed, the objectors 'did not bring a significant body of evidence to rebut the applicant's assessments which I was able to test and weigh in the balance'. 123 In Rampion, the ExA 'received many representations from interested parties who were private individuals' about the impact of the proposal on the South Downs National Park, with a 'typical' concern being about the 'cluttering of the view'.
The ExA gave 'careful consideration' to these representations, but turned swiftly to the applicants' (technical) impact assessment. 124 Similarly, the Brechfa Forest West Wind Farm
Report was 'informed' by responses from the local community, 125 but the reasoning concentrated on the discussion of methodologies for landscape assessment. 
Professional planning knowledge claims
By contrast with judges and courts (notwithstanding increasing specialisation in the lower courts, and the huge experience some judges bring to planning matters), the ExA brings its own planning expertise to the table. This is a very significant resource. It may be a little paradoxical to discuss it in terms of a knowledge claim, since the ExA also determines the strength of the various knowledge claims for the purpose of the decision making process. But nevertheless, the evidence from professional experience enters into the process in a provisional way, its significance awaiting the construction of the reasons for the decision. We might also contrast this with the way in which the Secretary of State exercises planning judgment, relying perhaps on a legitimacy based less in expertise and planning experience, more on political experience and democratic status. 127 The most striking way in which the ExA's own knowledge enters into the knowledge base for the decision is through the site inspection (or visit 
Striving for objective judgment
We might draw a few conclusions from the discussion above. First, prior institutional knowledge claims, in the form of prior decisions on the status of a particular landscape, are powerful in the assessment of the values associated with that landscape, its 'beauty' and its merit. These claims are unproblematically incorporated into the reason giving process, as something 'known' about the world. Second, expert or technical knowledge claims dominate a great deal of the reasoning, and are best defeated by challenges expressed as competing technical knowledge claims. Third, lay or experiential knowledge is notable for its absence from the Navitus ExA Report, and whilst in other decisions it is treated with rhetorical respect, it does not generally feed into the reasoning. And fourth, notwithstanding the influence of standardised methodologies and approaches, professional planning knowledge claims are a persistent feature of the reasoning. This is not surprising, given that ultimately decisions are a matter of planning judgment.
The precise conclusions drawn here are, as suggested in the introduction, specific to the particular context of (1) landscape impacts of (2) nationally significant (3) wind energy projects.
In a sense, this is the point: knowledge, for the purposes of providing reasons for a decision, is constructed within a particular legal and social process, just as the reasoning and decision
are constructed by what we know. 140 But equally, there may be broader food for thought.
The three types of knowledge claim that feature in the reason giving process may speak to the same aspiration to objectivity: 'objectivity' not in the sense of facts that can be relied upon by all people everywhere regardless of their position or interests, or objectivity as a state of mind; but in Jasanoff's terms, objectivity as a hard-won social achievement. 143 Turning to our three knowledge claims, first, prior institutional knowledge removes some of the controversy over value to another forum, and provides a neat and tidy set of facts for decision making.
Secondly, however well-understood the embedding of values in expert or technical knowledge claims, one of the familiar functions of highly technical approaches is to be seen to achieve consistency between decisions and decision makers, and to step back from political controversy. Thirdly, professional knowledge claims may speak to a similar assertion of emotional distance 144 and shared values.
The knowledge built from these three sets of claim is not necessarily expected to represent a full picture of the facts: 145 the reason giving process does not seek 'truth pure and simple', but '"serviceable truth"'. 146 It is common for knowledge, and the methodologies behind it, to be valued in law not for their offer of truth, but primarily for their 'pragmatic utility', 147 their ability to provide more or less stable and acceptable 'facts' for a process to go forward. 148 Knowledge of what we mean by landscape, and what change within it and to it will amount to, allows for particular ways of organising our social world. This seems most obvious with the cognitive techniques that I classify as expert / technical knowledge claims. 149 But it applies equally to both speaks to, and begs questions about, the social purposes of knowledge in planning.
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In the first instance, the purpose of the knowledge is simply to allow decisions to proceed, and to allow us to govern landscape (and wind energy). In many cases, the social as well as legal adequacy of reasons will be uncontentious. It is not difficult, however, to envisage situations in which the attempt at resolution and settling fails, and challenges to the deeper policy commitments (often pro-development) embedded in what we 'know' in planning persist, notwithstanding the assertion of authority in a completed decision making process.
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Conclusions
There are obvious difficulties and concerns about the knowledge practices on display in these decisions. In particular, decision making is not adapting to embrace lay knowledge, even in this apparently most opportune area; on the contrary, objectors are adapting the presentation and communication of their experience to fit in with the dominant technical mode of decision making. 153 This is potentially exclusionary and reductive of the real concerns, and in particular diminishes any opportunity explicitly to discuss place attachment. 154 But for instrumental and short term reasons, it seems to be the best option available to those seeking to contribute to planning decisions. Just as objections to applications must be framed in planning terms (about land use), and challenges before the court need generally to be on procedural grounds rather than substance, landscape objections to NSIP proposals are most likely to be heard if framed in technical terms, and if directly and precisely challenging of the competing technical presentation of the applicant.
But my purpose here is not to advocate any particular approach, it is to explore the complex dynamics of these extraordinarily richly documented decisions. The constructed nature of knowledge is very apparent when we try to understand landscape, and the laborious elucidation of reasons speaks to a concerted effort to construct objectivity. 
